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Summary
This essay explores the relationship between religion and politics in the context of
the Christian communities in the Middle East. The crisis of state framework is
used to explain that as the spiritual leader of their communities, the heads of the
Coptic Orthodox and Maronite churches – Patriarch Shenouda III and Patriarch
Nasrallah Sfeir – have felt compelled to act as communal spokesmen in the absence
of other credible political actors. It is argued that the lack of widespread political
participation, failure of economic development and chronic insecurity in the Middle
East have led to an environment where increased perception of vulnerability has
allowed religion to retain social significance.
Introduction
In the Middle East today, religion is widely accepted as retaining its social significance in the
region. The crisis of state thesis can be used to explain the apparent absence of the
secularization process in this area of the developing world. Several states have delivered
neither economic development nor meaningful political participation. In some cases,
governments have failed in their basic duty to provide security to their citizens. Under these
conditions, religious institutions are able to remain central to society, thus increasing the
likelihood that religious leaders will be able to exercise a political role. The study of
politicized religion has been adequately addressed concerning Islam and Judaism but little
work has been undertaken concerning Christianity. In the Eastern Christian tradition, the
patriarch as the head of the church has historically enjoyed a dual role as the spiritual and
temporal leader of the community. This capacity still remains today. As the leading
communal actor, the church has the potential to fill any leadership vacuum and can use its
resources to strengthen the claim of the patriarch to be the political representative of the
2community at the expense of lay rivals. For the purpose of this study, the political role of the
patriarch is defined as acting as the civil representative of the community and liasing between
the community and the ruling authorities. It is not an attempt to take over the state or gain
political power but instead, as throughout the centuries, to ensure the best means of survival
for the community. By placing this discussion within the crisis of state framework, this essay
will seek to explain why certain patriarchal churches exercise a significant political role,
suggesting that patriarchal authority and the Islamic environment reinforces communal
acceptance of the temporal power of the patriarch.
The two case studies selected for this research – the Coptic Orthodox and Maronite
churches – demonstrate that under certain conditions, the patriarch can choose to reassert the
political role of his office. Although the two churches represent different interpretations of
the christological definitions that split the universal church in the fifth century, they share
several key characteristics. Firstly, both evoke a distinct identity on the basis of faith yet are
directly linked to a specific homeland – Egypt and Lebanon respectively. Secondly, both
communities have pressing if different concerns as indigenous Christians in a turbulent
regional environment dominated by another religion. Thirdly, since becoming the head of
each church, Patriarch Shenouda III, Coptic Orthodox Patriarch of Alexandria and all Africa
and Patriarch Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir, Patriarch of Antioch and all the East of the Maronites,
have proven to be charismatic and influential figures in church and national affairs. Finally,
the two case studies best represent the potential of Christian communities to have a political
role in this region. While the Copts constitute only a small proportion of the Egyptian
population (5-10 per cent), they are still the largest Christian community in the Middle East,
numbering around 5-6 million.1 In contrast, the Maronites are a small community in terms of
size. It is estimated that there are no more than 600,000 Maronites in Lebanon. Yet within
Lebanon, they still make up over 20 per cent of the population, offering them a chance to have
3a significant impact on national affairs.2 A brief outline of the two communities will focus
on the background and personality of the two patriarchs, the current concerns of the
communities and the patriarchal response to these challenges. Finally, seven variables will
be identified to help indicate the type of political role one would expect the patriarch to have.
The Crisis of State Approach
Religion is often perceived as becoming politicized when there is a crisis of state. Increasing
awareness of the limits of modernization and subsequent disenchantment has resulted in
questions of meaning and identity being given as much importance as material and economic
issues. In the developing world, these crises take a different form from those experienced in
the West. The failure to deliver development and democracy is widespread. Economic
development has failed to keep up with population growth, leading to increasing domestic
inequality. The state tends to be bureaucratic, inefficient and unable to respond to these
problems. Modernization has not resulted in the expected benefits. According to Murden,
‘For far too many Middle Easterners, modernization meant an urban experience of poverty,
underemployment, poor housing and services, and few prospects’.3 This social crisis has
been coupled with the failure to provide political participation. Instead, these states are often
characterised by authoritarianism, patriomonialism and corruption.
Norris and Inglehart expand on these ideas in their hypothesis of secularization based on
existential security.4 They argue that individuals expect the provision of ‘human security’ to
be a key achievement of the state. Human security is defined as the lack of immediate risk to
personal safety, for example, violence, natural/manmade disasters, disease and poverty. In
poorer states, a significant proportion of the population is vulnerable to these threats.
However, in post-industrial societies, conditions greatly improve as even the most vulnerable
4groups in society are covered to some extent by health and social services. While economic
development is a prerequisite to attain this level of human security, industrialization alone is
not enough. Without the transition to a post-industrial phase, socioeconomic inequalities
pose an extremely visible threat to stability. Norris and Inglehart demonstrate that there is a
general correlation between the removal of immediate risks and the decline of religiosity in a
specific society. This fits into the Weberian view of the secularizing influence of wealth.
However, this trend can also be halted or reversed if threats re-emerge such as natural
disasters.
Applying this approach to the Middle East, most countries have experienced aspects of
modernization. However, it has proved an uneven process and served to heighten
socioeconomic inequality. The perception of vulnerability remains strong whether from
violence or, more frequently, poverty. While the modernization process may have a mixed
record, the region has clearly not reached the postmaterialist phase. The transition to a
capitalist economy concentrating on the individual rather than the community has not
occurred to the same extent as in the West. As religion tends to draw support from the
community, it is unsurprising that religion continues to enjoy social significance in this
society. In contrast to the numerous ideologies championed by regimes, religious institutions
have remained steadfast and provided enduring values. People have turned to an indigenous
and authentic identity that offers answers to the many concerns faced by them. Throughout
this Muslim majority region, the response of many Muslims has been to support religious
movements, which proclaim that Islam can provide a solution to these ills. The success of
these organizations in fulfilling the duties of the state e.g. social and welfare services, ensures
that politicized religion is seen as a viable alternative to the existing discredited policies.
The crises detailed above affect all citizens of the region, regardless of religious affiliation.
For Christians, the failure of Arab nationalism to deliver its promises once in power was
5especially significant, as they had long depended on this route to attain equality. Instead,
little progress towards full citizenship was made. Coupled with the failure to provide
material benefits, Christian backing for the ideology they had long supported began to wane.
The growth of political Islam as the main opposition to existing regimes heightened
perceptions of vulnerability including increased communal tension and the potential
curtailment of rights under an Islamic regime. Desperately requiring strong leadership,
Christian communities tend to have weak and divided lay representatives who often lack
legitimacy within the community. Thus with few alternatives, Christians, like their Muslim
compatriots, have also turned to a religious institution to provide comfort during this difficult
period. While certainly not a return to Christianity as the Middle Eastern Christian
population has always retained its religious identity, it is evident that some communities
expect the church to adopt a proactive role regarding their concerns. On a practical level,
church organizations, like Islamist movements, have continued to provide social services for
their communities, for example, schools, hospitals, employment aid and charity. The lack of
political representation has also offered an opportunity for church leaders to undertake a more
overt political role by acting as the main representatives of their community. The increased
role of Eastern churches in politics does not have the same aims as Islamist movements.
Rather than wishing to seize power or change the fundamental values of society, the core aim
of this political activism is to articulate the rights and needs of the Christian communities.
Regarding the selected case studies, it is clear that both Egypt and Lebanon are experiencing
crises of state which have particular resonance for the Coptic and Maronite communities
respectively. The inability of the Egyptian government to tackle socioeconomic problems
combined with the general feeling among Copts of alienation from political participation are
factors which can be seen as contributing towards the strength of the Coptic Orthodox Church
as the leading communal institution. At present, there are no credible rivals to the role of the
6church as civil representative of the community. In the early twentieth century, the Wafd
party offered Coptic Christians a chance to participate fully with their Muslim compatriots to
attain independence from the British.5 Coptic influence declined after the 1952 revolution
partly as a consequence of nationalization measures. Few are selected as parliamentary
candidates and even less are successfully elected. Most Coptic deputies are appointed by the
president and two are usually included in the cabinet.6 Furthermore, many Copts perceive
that neither these representatives nor government officials are willing to prioritise Coptic
concerns. These include equality, political participation, church building regulations,
conversions and violent attacks. Feelings of insecurity are heightened with each new incident
of Christian-Muslim tension.7
Unlike Egypt, Lebanon has never enjoyed what could be termed a strong state. In fact,
Lebanon experienced the ultimate crisis of state - civil war. Although the Maronite Church
as an institution was also perceived as weak during the conflict years, unlike the state, it has
recovered its legitimacy under Patriarch Sfeir. In post-war Lebanon, the main Maronite
concerns centred on the Syrian influence, which was blamed for restricting the predominantly
Christian opposition, curtailing Lebanese sovereignty and freedom and eroding the traditional
position of the Maronite community.8 Ongoing instability since the assassination of former
Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri has increased feelings of vulnerability especially amongst
Christians who were the primary targets of a series of bomb attacks in Lebanon during 2005.
The Lebanese confessional system also serves to accentuate religious ties in the political
sphere, thus ensuring that religious identity remains a key factor. Therefore, it can be
concluded that when the level of state crisis is high, the political situation of the country
where the patriarch resides becomes the crucial factor. As will be seen shortly, if the
patriarch is willing to undertake an active leadership role, members of the group are usually
7agreeable to delegating political representation to the church leaders who have tried to cater to
their spiritual and material needs.
Historical Experience
The traditional authority given to the patriarch is also crucial in understanding community
acceptance of the political activities of their spiritual head. The term patriarch was used to
describe the head of the five major sees (Rome, Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch and
Jerusalem).9 The patriarch is more than the head of the church. He is the father of the flock,
symbol of the faith and figurehead of the community. In the Coptic Orthodox case, loyalty to
the patriarch led to the eventual establishment of an independent church. Through the
strength of the monastic movement in the desert, the church in Egypt had enjoyed influence in
international church affairs especially over doctrinal issues. The unity of the early church
was shattered by doctrinal controversies in the fifth century. The power of the Egyptian
church was challenged at the Council of Chalcedon in 451 when their decision at the previous
council (Ephesus in 449) to depose the patriarchs of Antioch and Constantinople was
repudiated. Instead, this council pronounced that Christ possessed two natures, divine and
human, which were joined in one person. Many theologians in Egypt, Syria and Armenia
rejected this definition. The church in Egypt remained loyal to the deposed patriarch of
Alexandria and refused to recognise any patriarch imposed on them from Constantinople.
This also illustrated the divide between the Hellenized elite who mainly resided in Alexandria
and the rural majority who used the Coptic language. The term Copt comes from the Greek
for Egypt – aigyptos.10 In this sense, the Coptic Orthodox Church can be regarded as the
Egyptian national church. Its members continued to resist the increasingly violent attempts
by the authorities to reunite the early church. The Arab conquest signalled the end of
Byzantine persecution and the beginning of a new era.
8The Arab Conquest was also partly responsible for the formation of another Eastern
Christian church. Not all Christians in the geographical area of Syria had rejected the
teachings of the Council of Chalcedon. A group of disciples of a fourth century hermit
Maron had founded a monastery in his memory. These monks were subject to persecution
including the massacre of 350 monks in 517 by followers of Patriarch Severus of Antioch.11
Church historians claim that because the last Orthodox Patriarch in Antioch died in 609 and
his successors resided in Constantinople, the Maronite community was in grave need of a
leader. The vacant see was filled in the late seventh century. In this way, the Maronite
monastic community evolved into a ‘church’ with its own hierarchy and ecclesiastical
autonomy.12 Given the title of Maronite Patriarch of Antioch and All The East, the first
patriarch John Maron is regarded as the founder of the Maronite Church. Having lost
Byzantine protection either due to electing their patriarch without the consent of the emperor,
or as some historians claim, due to their following of the compromise Monothelitist doctrine,
John Maron was credited with winning a decisive battle against the Byzantine army. 13
Continual conflict resulted in waves of emigration to the safety of Mount Lebanon. The
attachment to this area as a territorial and historic homeland is a strong component of
Maronite identity.
Both rites have historically had strong patriarchal authority, derived from a combination of
canon law and tradition. In the Coptic tradition, the canons assert the importance of the
leadership of the church. Although the election rite has varied in the past, the present system,
which was agreed in 1957, aims to ensure that the elected candidate will enjoy the support of
the community. An electoral committee choose three candidates from a wider list who are
then drawn by altar lot. A fourth name is added, ‘Jesus Christ the Good Shepherd’ to prove
to the faithful that the candidate has been divinely approved.14 Once elected, the Coptic
Orthodox Patriarch enjoys supreme authority over the community. A vacancy arises only
9with the death of a patriarch : he cannot be removed from office. The Holy Synod is the
highest ecclesiastical body in the church and is responsible for all church affairs. In theory,
the patriarch governs the church in conjunction with the synod but due to the position
attributed to the patriarch (who presides over its meetings), it cannot be described as an
independent force. However, the patriarch does have to take into consideration the opinions
of his community. This was institutionalised in the late nineteenth century with the
establishment of the al-majlis al-milli (community council) which was instigated by the laity
elite who wished to gain control of the financial and administrative affairs of the church.
However, as Meinardus suggests, ‘patriarchs always looked at the majlis al-milli as an
organization which restricted their authorities’.15 Under republican governments since 1952,
the activities of the council have been weakened in favour of the patriarch. Representatives
are included in the electoral committee but members voted on to the council rarely differ with
the church hierarchy, especially the patriarch.16 Although laity participation remains an
important tradition in the Coptic Orthodox Church, such activities cannot be described as
effective constraints on patriarchal authority. Finally, in most instances, once the patriarch is
elected, the government has little involvement in church affairs.17 However, the patriarch
must obtain recognition from the president and in extreme circumstances, this can be revoked
as occurred in 1981.
Turning to the Maronite rite, the role of the patriarch in the Eastern Catholic Churches is
defined in the 1990 Codex Canonum Ecclesiarum Orientalium (CCEO), the codification of
canon law for these churches. The importance of the patriarch to the church has been clearly
stressed. Canon 55 states, ‘According to the most ancient traditions of the Church, already
recognized by the first ecumenical councils, the patriarchal institution has existed in the
church : for this reason a special honour is to be accorded to the patriarchs of the Eastern
Churches, each of whom presides over his patriarchal church as father and head’.18 The
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patriarch enjoys executive and administrative powers and is the highest juridical authority for
the community concerning personal statute laws. Although bishops must resign aged
seventy-five, this is not applicable to patriarchs, hence illustrating the importance of the
position. The main constraint on the Maronite patriarch is that final authority in Eastern
Catholic churches lies with the pope – the supreme head of the universal church. This means
that the Vatican is involved in all aspects of church affairs. The pope must be informed of a
vacant see and patriarchal elections and has indirect influence on the nominations to the
office.19 Furthermore, the patriarch and the synod are interdependent. The patriarch has the
executive role as he convokes and presides over the synod while the synod enjoys legislative
and judicial power. In conclusion, in both case studies, the patriarch exercises substantial
authority. As this is derived from canon law, the patriarch enjoys legitimacy to an extent
which cannot be replicated by other leaders. Using this as a foundation, the head of the
church has the resources to provide both spiritual and civil leadership to the community.
The historical experience of Christianity in the Middle East has also proved influential in
maintaining patriarchal authority. Eastern Christianity underwent a different historical
process from that of the Western churches – one which denied it political power but allowed it
to remain a key aspect of identity. It enjoyed only a short period of power - when it was
declared the official religion of the Roman Empire in the fourth century until the Arab
Conquest in the early seventh century. The conquest effectively halted the ability of Eastern
Christianity to seek political power as the new empire was based on another religion – Islam.
Yet, the temporal role of the patriarch was ironically reinforced through centuries of Islamic
rule as the patriarch was identified as the civil leader of their community. Under Muslim
rule, the Christians as ahl al-kitab (people of the book) became dhimmi (covenanted people).20
The different Christian communities in the region were treated as distinct groups with the
patriarch held responsible for the conduct of the entire community. In general, the patriarch
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continued to enjoy authority over the internal affairs of the community on the condition that
taxes were paid and that there was no interference in Islam – the state religion. In order to
collect taxes, the patriarchs were given positions in the administrative system and allocated
‘civil coercive authority’ to attain this.21 This system allowed the Eastern churches to retain
control over all aspects of life for their communities. Yet Eastern Christians had no
possibility of attaining state power and thus escaped revolt against the church state system as
experienced in Europe.
Under the Ottoman Empire, this practice of autonomy became institutionalised and known
as the millet system. According to Pacini, ‘The religious authorities of each millet acted both
as representatives of the members of their millet and as intermediaries between the latter and
central power in administrative matters’.22 The Greek Orthodox Patriarch in Constantinople
was responsible for all religious, civil, legal, educational and financial affairs in the Christian
millet.23 Other heads of churches were also able to secure their position as the civil heads of
their communities. The religious heads (excluding the Maronite patriarch who relied on
French protection) were given a berat – legal recognition of their position. The geographical
distance from Constantinople to Egypt and Lebanon allowed the Coptic Orthodox and
Maronite patriarchs to continue to exercise de facto control of their community with little
external interference from the Greek Orthodox.
In the Egyptian case, the development of an indigenous millet system illustrates the close
connection between the Coptic Orthodox community and the Egyptian nation state.
Although nominally part of the Ottoman Empire, due to geographical location, the rulers of
Egypt tended to enjoy autonomous power to an extent that allowed the notion of a distinct
Egyptian identity to remain.24 Consequently, it was natural that the figures of the Sultan and
the Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Constantinople would be replaced by the Egyptian ruler and
the Coptic Orthodox Patriarch – the leader of the vast majority of Christians in Egypt.25 In
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most cases, the Coptic Orthodox patriarchs remained politically passive, preferring to
concentrate on securing internal dominance within the community. For example, Patriarch
Kyrillos VI secured presidential permission to build an agreed number of churches each year
and was rewarded when the Nasser government abolished the al-majlis al-milli in 1962 (the
main communal rival to patriarchal power).26 In exchange for these measures, the patriarch
promoted loyalty to the government especially during the crises of 1956 and 1967, thus
conforming to the traditional millet model of community relations.
In contrast, the Maronites did not live under strict millet conditions. This was mainly due
to their isolation in their remote homeland of Mount Lebanon. Ottoman authority rarely
penetrated deeply into this area, partly due to its remoteness and partly due to its tradition of
being a safe haven for different minority groups for example, Maronites and Druze.
Individual rulers remained relatively independent and in some cases, were favourable to the
Maronite community.27 The patriarch did liase between the ruler and the community but
without the sense of inferiority that was inherent in the millet system.28 Thus, the Maronite
patriarch has always had a political dimension as the leader of the community. Patriarch
Hoyek is considered a founding father of the modern state of Lebanon as he was instrumental
in securing the establishment of Greater Lebanon under the French mandate at the 1919
Versailles Conference. Similarly, Patriarch Meouchi played an active role during the 1958
crisis in ensuring that opposition to the policies of President Chamoun did not descend into
religious conflict.29 In conclusion, it can be seen that centuries of Islamic rule maintained
and perhaps enhanced the civil authority of the Christian religious leaders in this region.
Case Studies
In both case studies, the incumbent in the patriarchal office has greatly influenced the
development of his church and community. The future Patriarch Shenouda was born Nazir
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Gayed in 1923 to a middle class family in Assiut (Upper Egypt), graduated in History from
Cairo University and was an army officer in the 1948 war against Israel.30 He became known
as a theologian, journalist, orator and poet and was actively involved in the influential Sunday
School movement. Entering monastic life in 1954 aged thirty-one, he remained for eight
years until he was consecrated Bishop of Higher Theological Studies in 1962.31 According to
Heikal, ‘Shenouda was the outstanding representative of the new generation of militant
monks, determined to change the Church from an isolated and backward institution into
something more in tune with the contemporary world’.32 One important activity was his
weekly meetings – dars al-juma’a (lesson on Friday). His willingness to answer questions
from ordinary members of the community often with humorous remarks not only illustrated
the difference from the traditional clergy but also helped to ensure that he became well-known
within the community.33 After the death of Patriarch Kyrillos VI in 1971, the forty-seven
year old Shenouda was elected by altar lot having come second behind Bishop Samuel in the
first stage of the elections.34
Similarly, the present Maronite patriarch has also been heavily involved in church activities
throughout his life. Born in Rayfoun, Kesrouan in 1920, Nasrallah Sfeir studied Philosophy
and Theology at the University of St. Joseph in Beirut. In 1950, he was ordained into the
priesthood and served in his home parish of Rayfoun. From 1956 until 1961, he was
professor of translation in literature and philosophy at the Maronite Brothers School in
Jounieh. After being ordained Bishop of Tarsus in 1961, he served as a Patriarchal Vicar and
continued to be the Secretary of the Maronite Patriarchate until his election in 1986.35
During this period, Nasrallah Sfeir was known for his moderate political views in contrast to
the radicalization that affected many in the community as a consequence of the Lebanese civil
war. Helmick states that this bishop represented those in the Maronite community who were
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not frightened of their Muslim neighbours but instead wished to restore harmonious
relations.36
Both patriarchs experienced a turbulent period during their early years in office. According
to Ansari, Patriarch Shenouda represented the movement within the church hierarchy that was
no longer willing to seek recourse through the traditional method of private representation of
Coptic concerns to state officials.37 Instead, he saw it as his duty to adopt an assertive role to
stand up for the collective rights of the community. This view coincided with a growing
Islamization process under the presidency of Anwar Sadat. Coptic grievances regarding
church building, discrimination and the legal system were not dealt with under the auspices of
the traditional millet system. For example in 1972, the offices of a Christian society in
Khanka, which was being used as an unofficial church due to the difficulties in gaining
building permits, were set on fire. In response, Patriarch Shenouda sent one hundred priests
and monks to protest at this incident and conduct prayers on the site. Consequently, the
situation escalated when local Muslims attacked Christian property.38 Communal tensions
were raised again in 1977 when the government attempted to introduce sharia law into the
Egyptian legal system. 39 Again, Patriarch Shenouda pursued a public approach by holding a
Coptic Conference and calling for a five day collective fast to highlight the problems facing
the community. The government abandoned the bill but violence against the Copts increased
as many Muslims resented what they perceived as unnecessary Coptic interference in a
Muslim only issue. Finally in 1980, amidst increased sectarian violence, the government
amended the constitution to acknowledge sharia law as being the principal source of
legislation. The patriarch cancelled the 1980 Easter celebrations and retired with the church
hierarchy to a desert monastery.40 This was accompanied by demonstrations organised by
Coptic émigrés during Sadat’s visit to the United States. While these examples illustrated a
break from the traditional co-operative political role of the church, they were mostly reactions
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to legislative proposals or attacks against Coptic property. However, this confrontational
approach failed to resolve the underlying issues and served only to anger Sadat. Perceiving
Patriarch Shenouda as a threat to his authority, Sadat publicly attacked the church hierarchy
by accusing the patriarch of conspiring to establish a Coptic state in Upper Egypt and inciting
sectarian strife.41 After clashes at Zawya al-Hamra in 1981, Sadat launched a crackdown on
all opposition and banished Patriarch Shenouda to a monastery in Wadi Natroun. It was not
until Christmas 1985 that his successor Hosni Mubarak gave permission for his return.42
Patriarch Sfeir also faced severe problems once elected as a consequence of the ongoing
civil war. Both the community and church hierarchy were divided over what factions to
support. As Patriarch Sfeir was not the candidate of the Lebanese Forces, the dominant
Christian group at this time, he immediately faced opposition to his policies. Once elected,
he tried to continue reconciliation measures sponsored by his predecessor. On a visit to
Algeria in 1987, he met the leader of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) Yasser
Arafat and later declared that the Palestinian cause was ‘sacred’.43 This diplomacy did not
gain a favourable response from many sections of the Maronite community who still blamed
the Palestinians for the outbreak of violence in Lebanon. Patriarch Sfeir was instrumental in
ensuring that the 1989 Document of National Understanding gained enough legitimacy in
Christian circles to succeed. Known as the Taif Accord, it maintained the confessional
system but sanctioned the presence of the Syrian army. 44 However, this agreement was
rejected by many ordinary Maronites, including the followers of General Michel Aoun (the
caretaker Prime Minister). Incensed at the acquiescence of their patriarch to what they
perceived as Syrian hegemony, the patriarch was jostled by demonstrators and consequently
sought refuge in the Syrian occupied sector.45 This was the first time that the moral authority
of the patriarch had been seriously challenged by the community. The patriarch publicly
condemned the subsequent intra-Christian fighting, deeming it ‘collective suicide’.46 By the
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end of the civil war, the main aim of the patriarch was to oversee the rejuvenation of the
Maronite church and as a consequence, the entire community.
The response of both patriarchs to the problems facing their respective communities can be
divided into three interdependent areas – spiritual, social and political. Since the 1940s, the
Coptic Orthodox Church has experienced a spiritual renewal that has revitalised the church.
As one of the architects of this process, Patriarch Shenouda has been able to place the church
at the centre of the community. Church attendance has increased massively to the extent that
churches are full and extra services are held to accommodate the needs of the community.
The ongoing monastic revival has energised the wider church. There has been a significant
expansion in both the number of monasteries and monks. Monks are predominantly well-
educated, often university graduates and aged between twenty-five and forty and this vocation
has now become a model career for many Copts, especially the youth.47 The laity have also
been incorporated into the organisational structure through work as deacons and church
servants.48 Leisure time is dominated by the church. Activities include prayer groups, visits
to monasteries and voluntary work restoring icons, churches and monasteries. The church
has concentrated greatly on the youth. It is no surprise that the Sunday School movement
plays an important role in educating the children on their faith considering its influential
figures now occupy top positions in the church hierarchy. Similar to the Islamic revival, this
Coptic renewal is also visible. Christian homes and shops frequently have religious symbols,
for example, pictures depicting scenes from the bible, and women often wear jewellery
shaped in a cross. The revival has led to emphasising a distinct Coptic identity. The study
of the ancient Coptic language has been encouraged as a means to rediscover Coptic heritage.
The Coptic Renewal has allowed the church to provide a space for Copts where they can fully
participate. According to Hasan, ‘By giving all Copts a role to play from their early teens on,
the church has provided them with a compensatory status system and a chance of upward
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mobility outside of civil society’.49 However, this appears to be at the cost of withdrawal
from wider Egyptian society.
To a lesser extent, the Maronite Church has also undergone a spiritual renewal in the post-
war years. Both the Vatican and the Maronite hierarchy have addressed the divisions within
the church in order to rebuild communal unity. The Pope convened The Special Synod for
Lebanon (1991-1995) and stressed the need for all Catholic communities in Lebanon to join
together to attain spiritual renewal. It outlined the Papal vision of the Lebanese future – one
where Christians and Muslims work together to rebuild their country.50 This was followed
by the Apostolic Exhortation ‘A New Hope for Lebanon’ which was signed by the Pope
during his visit to Lebanon in 1997. The Maronite Church also enacted its own initiatives for
church renewal. After several attempts, the Maronite Synod was opened in 2003. It is the
first time that members of the ‘Maronite family’ have been brought together from around the
world to discuss the affairs of their church. The issues addressed include the identity,
mission and role of the church, pastoral renewal and the diaspora.51 Following the precedent
established at the Special Synod for Lebanon, representatives of other religious communities
in Lebanon – Christian and Muslim – were invited to attend. The Maronite spiritual renewal
is also apparent when examining the devotion to the saints. At the canonization of the
nineteenth century monk Neamatallah Kassab Hardini in 2004, 50,000 Lebanese pilgrims
travelled to Rome while thousands more attended celebrations in the Monastery of Kfifane.52
Thus, this focus on spirituality can provide solace for the Maronite community in times of
difficulty.
The provision of social services has become an important part of the ministry provided by
the two churches. These initiatives have allowed the churches to fill the vacuum left by the
state. The Coptic Orthodox Bishopric of Public, Ecumenical and Social Services provides
material assistance, educational classes, literacy programme and job training schemes.53
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However, some critics such as the late influential monk Father Matta al-Maskeen raise
concerns that these social services will attract Copts to the church for material not spiritual
reasons. In the Maronite case, such services help to preserve Maronite identity. In the post
war era, the church has tried to maintain its presence throughout the country by repairing
institutions and supporting the return of refugees in areas that have been depopulated of
Christians. Aware of the economic plight of the country, the church, particularly through the
monastic orders, has continued its key role in education and health as well as providing land
for affordable housing. While the hierarchy has tried to provide for the needs of the
community, some Maronites have criticised these efforts as inadequate considering the extent
of resources that the church possesses especially land and institutions.54
Finally, both patriarchs have chosen to fill the leadership vacuum by acting as the political
spokesman of the community. Although Patriarch Shenouda attempted this during the Sadat
era, there has been a change in methods as he has returned to the millet system of supporting
the government in return for enjoying autonomy over the community. In interviews and
prepared statements, he urges the government to reach out to disaffected Copts but praises
initiatives that are perceived as aiming to address Coptic grievances, especially church
building. Each new permit for construction or repair work is mentioned in al-Keraza (the
church magazine) and accompanied by a message of appreciation to President Mubarak.55
Until recently, the church hierarchy did not support specific candidates or parties instead
solely advising that the community should participate in national life. Yet, the patriarch
controversially gave his full support to President Mubarak in the first presidential elections
held in 2005.56 Patriarch Shenouda has frequently complimented the president, stating that
he is attentive to Coptic concerns. ‘President Mubarak is an enemy of all sorts of extremism,
bigotry and discrimination’.57 This strategy illustrates the political astuteness of the patriarch
as he is aware that while conditions may not be perfect, the Mubarak regime has proved
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relatively tolerant to the Coptic community, which could not be guaranteed under other
candidates. Concerning Coptic electoral participation, the patriarch argues that if Copts
continue to be unsuccessful at winning seats, it is no surprise that they are becoming
politically apathetic.58 While the election of Youssef Boutros Boutros Ghali in 2000 was
welcomed, the patriarch highlighted that this government minister needed two rounds to
succeed even though he stood in a predominantly Coptic area.
On the issue of discrimination, Patriarch Shenouda has made a few selective comments.
His preferred method of dealing with contentious issues (conversions and church building)
appears to be through private discussions with officials. One notable exception was the
Wafaa Constantine affair in December 2004. In brief, the wife of a Coptic Orthodox priest
purportedly converted to Islam. Rumours immediately spread in the Coptic community that
she had been abducted and forcibly converted. Protestors gathered outside the patriarchate in
Cairo and clashed with security forces. Eventually, the woman was returned to the church
authorities where she announced that she had not changed her religion after all. This was not
before the patriarch had retreated to Wadi Natroun apparently in distress that the event had
not been resolved quickly.59 The significance of this symbolic act cannot be overemphasised
as this was exactly the type of method employed by Patriarch Shenouda during the tense
Sadat years to draw attention to Coptic grievances. The next edition of al-Keraza
concentrated on the disturbances and drew attention to general Coptic problems and the
behaviour of the security forces.60 Finally, the patriotism of Patriarch Shenouda is often
stressed. He rejects the idea that Copts are a minority, stressing that they are part of the
Egyptian nation and warns against any outside interference regarding Coptic concerns.61 He
is a firm supporter of the Palestinian cause, banning Coptic pilgrimages to Jerusalem until the
city is under Arab control. Clearly, the reign of Patriarch Shenouda has witnessed a more
assertive political approach than normally associated with this position. Yet, although
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Patriarch Shenouda has been fairly successful in consolidating power within the community,
this has not been transformed into tangible reforms from the government. Instead,
concessions have primarily been cosmetic acts to placate the patriarch and the community.
The conciliatory approach has fared little better than the assertive strategy in the Sadat era in
meeting Coptic needs, especially regarding discrimination and security.
The Maronite patriarch has always tended to be more overtly political. This is especially
true during the recent years of Syrian influence when the patriarch was instrumental in raising
issues that others were unwilling to risk. Through sermons, media statements and monthly
meetings of the Synod, the views of Patriarch Sfeir are made known. Many of these focused
on the Syrian presence. The repeated calls for the withdrawal of Syrian troops were always
placed in the context of regaining sovereignty as outlined in the Taif Accord. The bishops
rejected the notion that the Syrian presence was necessary to ensure stability in Lebanon.
‘When people say “it’s either the Syrian army or chaos”, it is an argument that simply does
not stand up’.62 This campaign enjoyed limited success with the gradual redeployment of
troops from Greater Beirut, Mount Lebanon and the North since June 2001. However, many
Syrian troops remained in the Beqaa region and it was not until the developments set in
motion by the assassination of Hariri in 2005 that a complete withdrawal took place.
Patriarch Sfeir has also addressed the complex issue of political participation, calling for an
electoral system based on small districts that would allow voters to directly affect the result.
The bishops expressed their disappointment when the previous electoral system was retained
for the first elections held after the Syrian withdrawal, warning that it would lead to negative
reactions from Christians who would perceive that little had changed.63 The patriarch
continues to condemn the political bickering, corruption and economic incompetence that has
plagued Lebanese politics for decades. He is particularly scathing of continued Christian
disunity.64
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Like Patriarch Shenouda, the Maronite patriarch also emphasises the patriotism of his
community, stressing that their vision of Lebanon is one of national unity and reconciliation
where all Lebanese regardless of their sect can enjoy equal participation, representation and a
decent standard of living. Indeed, almost all of the issues raised by the patriarch, particularly
those concerned with daily life, are stated on behalf of all Lebanese. It is apparent that
Patriarch Sfeir, like the majority of his predecessors, has continued to show an interest in
Lebanese political affairs. Compared to the situation of the Maronite church and community
in the late 1980s, a major achievement has been the ability of the patriarch to unite the
Maronites and act as a rallying point. However, it is evident that the church has enjoyed few
actual successes in attaining its goal of the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty and tackling
Maronite grievances. Although Patriarch Sfeir has tried to exert his authority, this has not led
to his domination of the community. The patriarch has understood that the political role of
the head of the Maronite Church in contemporary Lebanon must concentrate on providing
guidance to the community and the country at large rather than advocating radical measures to
achieve these aims. Patriarch Sfeir has retained his traditional predominant role but this has
not been transformed into credible temporal authority as exercised in the past.
Variables affecting the Political Role
Seven variables can be identified that help explain the political role of the present patriarchs
of these two traditions.
1) The tradition and authority invested in the patriarch
Historically, the patriarch has been regarded as the leader of the community. They have used
their authority to consolidate power. Once elected, the Coptic Orthodox patriarch exercises
almost complete control over the church. Theoretically, the Maronite patriarch has less
power due to the position of the Holy See, but in reality, the patriarch enjoys a predominant
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position in the community. Patriarchal authority alone is not indicative of a political role but
it can be used to encourage its development.
2) The identity of the community
Both groups have a distinct established identity. The main distinguishing feature is its
religious affiliation. The church tends to be the only institution that includes the entire
community and enjoys legitimacy. While their religious identity is not incompatible with
national identity, disappointment with the existing situation in terms of political participation
and equality, have led to a more exclusive approach. Allowing the church to act as civil
representative has led to the politicization of communal identity and left groups vulnerable to
accusations of disloyalty to the nation state.
3) The existence of a distinct homeland
Both communities identify a specific territory as their ancestral homeland. They do not claim
exclusive ownership, recognising that it is shared with other groups. The Coptic Orthodox
Church is regarded as the Egyptian national church. The Maronite church is similar although
one must recognise that there are other churches active in the country.
4) The willingness of church leaders to utilise their own institutions to cater to the needs of
the community
This has been an influential trend under both Patriarch Shenouda and Patriarch Sfeir. The
needs of the community can be divided into three areas – spiritual, social and political. Both
have experienced a period of spiritual revival. These have emphasised the distinct heritage of
the community and help to fulfil the need for belonging, which many feel is not obtained
within the national framework. Although social work has always been an element of
Christian ministry, socioeconomic problems have made this aspect imperative. By providing
welfare services, both churches have taken on many of the social responsibilities normally
associated with the state. Thirdly, both leaders have sought to articulate the aspirations and
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grievances of their community. They have interpreted their position as head of the church to
enable them to become the voice of the community. While all three aspects – spiritual, social
and political appear intertwined, it would seem that the patriarch is unlikely to be regarded as
a legitimate representative if the first two functions are not fulfilled.
5) The historical background and present political situation of the country
Religion has retained social significance in both Egypt and Lebanon. The views of religious
leaders tend to be respected by governments and considered relevant by many sectors of
society. The increased political role of the two spiritual chiefs is connected to the political
situation. Few consider that their opinions are taken into account by the ruling elite. For the
Coptic Orthodox, the disillusionment with the nationalist state is magnified because they had
hoped that nationalism would allow them to obtain full citizenship, yet instead, the perception
of discrimination remains. Concerning the Maronites, in contrast to their pre-war dominance,
some of their privileges have been eroded, particularly in terms of political participation.
This insecurity has been heightened by other factors. Both countries suffer from severe
socioeconomic problems - poverty, unemployment, poor housing and services. The
demographic context is also important. In numerical terms, both are minorites and in
proportion to the size of the Muslim population, their percentage of the population is in
decline. This adds to the perception of vulnerability and has led to the communities turning
inwards to the traditional system of political representation through the patriarch.
6) The personality and views of the patriarch
The present patriarchs of the two churches studied have had an astounding impact on their
respective churches. Both were involved in the inner workings of the institution before
becoming patriarch. Both are charismatic personalities who have managed to revitalize not
only their church but also their community. Both believe that it is their duty to voice
opinions on national affairs. The Coptic Orthodox Patriarch is perceived as representing
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solely Coptic interests whilst the Maronite patriarch has been termed the patriarch of Lebanon
as his statements often reflect concerns of ordinary Lebanese. This may reflect the different
situation in the two countries where the Copts are a clear minority whereas the Maronites are
one of several groups. The views of both patriarchs tend to correspond to the concerns of
their communities. It is clear that any religious leader who becomes involved in political
affairs has to walk a tightrope in order to satisfy the demands of a community without causing
strife either internally or with the authorities or wider society. The patriarchs are prone to
modifying their political strategies in accordance with developments in the country and
community. Examples include the change of methods used by Patriarch Shenouda under the
Sadat and Mubarak regimes or the stance of Patriarch Sfeir towards the question of the Syrian
presence in post-war Lebanon.
7) The challenges to patriarchal authority
The response to the political role of the patriarchs has mostly been favourable. Generally,
both communities have accepted that the patriarchs are motivated by their desire to safeguard
the community rather than personal ambition. While some would prefer that the church
concentrated solely on spiritual matters, there is awareness that the community needs
leadership which at present, can only be delivered by the patriarch. From the community,
challenges to patriarchal authority tend to be over the strategies followed. Elements of the
Coptic community have become radicalized and are increasingly willing to defend their faith
and church from perceived insults and threats as illustrated by the Wafaa Constantine affair.
So far, the patriarch has been able to accommodate these but any return to assertive policies
could have unwanted repercussions for the community. The Coptic diaspora also has the
potential to articulate other views. As these are often articulated within a persecution
discourse, their actions tend to have an adverse effect on communal relations in Egypt. In
contrast, the main communal challenge to Patriarch Sfeir comes from the Maronite secular
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elite. The decline of Syrian influence in Lebanon has led to the return to politics of
influential Christian leaders. Yet, the persistence of several rival factions, continued
instability and the personal belief of the patriarch that it is his duty to give his opinion on
political matters, suggests that he will continue to have a political role in Lebanon. The state
authorities can also curb the political role of the patriarch. The Egyptian government has lent
legitimacy to the patriarch by addressing the community through the millet system. In
Lebanon, the significance attached to the patriarch is illustrated by regular visits to the
patriarchate from politicians of all persuasions. Both patriarchs try to co-operate with their
governments to a certain extent. At societal level, there is general acceptance of a religious
leader undertaking civil representation on the understanding that the patriarch does not
actually participate in the decision-making process. The patriarchs occupy an influential
position but their ability to continue depends on events outside their control as they are
vulnerable to changes.
Conclusion
This essay has sought to demonstrate that the political role of the patriarch can be explained
by the political environment and historical experience of the communities. In both cases,
religious identity has become more pronounced as a consequence of the difficulties faced by
the nation state. This identity helps to maintain the cohesiveness of the community. Thus, it
is natural that the leader of the institution that provides this identity would be given the
opportunity to act as both the spiritual and civil leader of the group. Each church found itself
in a strong position because of the extent of patriarchal authority traditionally ascribed to the
religious head of the community. It would appear that the individual patriarch decides to a
large extent what role he will play. In the two examples, the church hierarchies have used
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their position as the leading communal institution to offer the community stability and
security by preserving group identity, providing for their material needs and articulating
political concerns. Furthermore, the political situation of the country where the patriarch
resides is crucial in determining what type of role the patriarch will have. In many cases, the
involvement of the patriarch in political matters tends to be a reaction to developments in the
country. The existence of a leadership vacuum (which is closely connected to domestic
political events) also greatly enhances the ability of the patriarch to act as spokesman of the
community.
The crisis of state environment would appear to provide the conditions that allow the
patriarch to adopt this role. To a certain extent, the continuance of this role depends on the
crisis of state conditions remaining. If these were to ease, alternatives to church
representation could emerge. The Coptic Orthodox Church has more chance in resisting
these changes. Both the government and society appear to have accepted the millet system as
the natural method to manage communal relations. Yet regardless of the methods pursued,
Patriarch Shenouda has failed to fully deliver the promises of Coptic equality, leaving space
for future challengers. In contrast, the Maronite Church has more experience of operating in
an environment characterised by secular leadership. However, the tradition of patriarchal
authority means that both churches are likely to continue their efforts to represent the
community. The difference would be that no longer would they enjoy the extent of influence
exercised at present. In conclusion, while the crisis of state conditions continue to exist, the
political role of the patriarch remains a crucial element when examining the significance of
religious leaders in Middle Eastern politics.
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